The conﬁdent opening statement of Article J of the Maastricht Treaty on European Union (TEU)
—‘A common foreign and security policy is hereby established’—was
thus qualiﬁed by carefully-crafted subsequent clauses, which registered unresolved
differences. Heads of government arrived in Maastricht to ﬁnd square brackets and
alternative drafts scattered throughout the CFSP text. They devoted much of their
time to other politically-sensitive chapters, leaving to foreign ministers and political
directors the task of negotiating mutually acceptable language. The outcome represented a modiﬁcation of existing institutional arrangements, rather than the major
change that the language of the treaty implied.
Policy initiative, representation, and implementation were explicitly reserved to
the Council presidency, ‘assisted if need be by the previous and next member states to
hold the Presidency’ (thus institutionalizing the existing troika). The Commission was
to be ‘fully associated’ with discussions in this inter-governmental pillar, and ‘the
views of the European Parliament . . . duly taken into consideration’ (Arts. J.5, J.9, J.7
TEU; now Arts. 18 and 21 CTEU). The WEU was designated ‘an integral part of the
development of the Union’, with its secretariat strengthened and moved from London
and Paris to Brussels (Art. J.4.(2) TEU; now Art. 17(1) CTEU); Declaration on Western
European Union). Ambiguous language allowed for ‘joint actions’ in pursuit of agreed
common aims, and referred to ‘the eventual framing of a common defence policy,
which might in time lead to a common defence’ (Arts. J.3, and J.4.(1) TEU; now Arts. 14
and 17(1) CTEU). An unresolved dispute between the British and the French over
further enlargement of WEU was overtaken by the Greek government’s last-minute
declaration that it would veto the entire TEU unless it was allowed to join the WEU.
This forced negotiators to offer associated status to Turkey and to other European (but
not necessarily EU) Nato members as well.
Comment by Adamantine:
This article may only satisfy the curiosity of a few. As I have researched the past of the WEU/ EU and the possible fulfillment of prophecy it has been a pleasure to find small pieces of the puzzle. This article reveals how the WEU became ten members. If it ultimately has any prophetic importance this simply shows that in some manner someday prophecy will be completed no matter the way it happens.
We can see that the decision to give the EU a name and a common foreign policy ( Treaty on European Union) also gave rise to the 10 horns in the WEU.
The decision to create the European Union also determined that for a time it would have ten horns.
However Greece did not actually join the WEU and the EU get its tenth horn until March 1995. This determined that the only leader to arise after the ten were actually in place was Javier Solana who became the secretary general of the WEU in 1999.